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ABSTRACT 
Even though the European Court of Justice has always played a significant role in European 
integration, its importance is bound to increase further as the European Union enlarges and the 
constitutionalization process continues. Yet despite the Court’s growing importance, we still know 
very little about why and how European publics tolerate the rule of any unelected, let alone a 
supranational, court. Even less is known about how newly democratized countries first learn to trust 
institutions such as the ECJ. This paper utilizes a quasi-experimental design to analyze the 
development of public support for the ECJ by comparing the nature, levels and development of support 
in West Germany to those in East Germany. Particular attention is given to the question of how 
support for the Court differs from support for the other institutions of European government and to 
how support for the supranational institutions compares to support for their national counterparts, as 
well as how perceptions at both levels square with a popular wish for “stealth democracy.” Based on 
evidence from two ALLBUS public opinion surveys and a series of focus groups conducted in West 
and East Germany, it appears that people make a functional connection between the national and the 
supranational court, evaluating them along similar dimensions. Unlike the other institutions of 
government both courts are seen as neutral, technical arbiters of the law that are fundamentally 
trustworthy because they do not benefit from their decisions. The European Court of Justice is 
considered as the functional equivalent of the Bundesverfassungsgericht at a different level of 
government. There are some differences between East and West Germany, but they are slight. The 
evidence suggests that citizens learn to trust supranational courts by first learning to trust the national 
constitutional court as a disinterested arbiter of political conflict.  
  
INTRODUCTION
1
Even though the European Court of Justice has always played a significant role in European 
integration, its importance is bound to increase further as the European Union enlarges and the 
constitutionalization process continues. Yet these same processes go hand in hand with intensifying 
public scrutiny of the Union, its institutions and policies – including those of the European Court of 
Justice. Yet as the importance of understanding public support for the European Court of Justice is 
increasing, we must realize that we still know woefully little about the  two important questions this 
paper addresses: Why and how do European publics tolerate the rule of any unelected – let alone a 
supranational – court? Furthermore, how do newly democratized countries first learn to trust 
institutions such as the ECJ?
 
The accession of ten new member states to the EU in May of 2004 widened the Court’s 
jurisdiction to ten new countries with approximately 75 million citizens. Just a few months later, the 
acceptance of a draft EU constitution that includes a legally binding Charter of Fundamental Rights 
promised to deepen the Court’s power even further (if and when the constitutional draft is ratified). 
However, as the European Union both widens and deepens simultaneously, the role of the European 
Court of Justice is likely to become more challenging, as well, as the Court will have to navigate 
increasing diversity under the brightening glare of public scrutiny. As the example of the Supreme 
Court of Canada demonstrates, rights-based issues are often controversial and thus destined to propel 
the courts in the limelight – at least eventually – and change the level and nature of public support for 
the Court (see Hausegger and Riddell 2004). Understanding the nature and origin of trust in the 
European Court of Justice is thus becoming particularly crucial. 
Investigating the Leads: The Research Design 
Despite the burgeoning of literature on public support for the U.S. Supreme Court (for example 
Caldeira and Gibson 1992, Gibson, Caldeira et al. 2003, Grosskopf and Mondak 1998, Hoekstra 2000, 
Mondak and Smithey 1997), studies of support for Constitutional Courts in other countries remain rare 
(but see Gibson, Caldeira et al. 1998, Hausegger and Riddell 2004). The European Court of Justice 
(ECJ) is no exception to this rule. Other than the Eurobarometer-based studies of James Gibson and 
Greg Caldeira (Caldeira and Gibson 1995, 1997, Gibson and Caldeira 1993, 1995, 1998), there are no 
studies of support for the Court of Justice.  
While these latter studies provide important insights into support for the ECJ, they also leave 
many questions open. First, these studies judged support for the Court to be rather low, yet often 
without providing the respective national support levels as points of reference (but c.f. Gibson and 
Caldeira 1998 who investigate support for the ECJ as compared to support for national high courts, but 
only in a bivariate analysis ). Yet as we know from recent research on the perception of the U.S. 
Congress, functional process evaluations are crucial for understanding institutional support (Hibbing 
and Theiss-Morse 2001, 2002). Thus, it is imperative to analyze support for the ECJ in conjunction 
with and relation to support for the ECJ’s national counterparts, while controlling for other relevant 
factors. Second, these studies of support for the ECJ were based on only three datasets collected within 
a two-year time period (1992-93) that was remarkable due to the post-Maastricht turmoil: two 
                                                 
1  The author gratefully acknowledges the financial support of the American Political Science Association. The paper is 
based in part on focus group data that the author collected with the help of funds from an APSA Small Research Grant. 
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Eurobarometer surveys and an in-depth follow-up survey.
2 None of the existing analyses have ever 
been compared to research based on different datasets collected during different time periods. Third, 
while existing studies of support for the ECJ cover many different countries, by necessity, they lack in-
depth contextualizing information that enables us to understand support for the Court against a fuller 
understanding of its national backdrop and unique national circumstances. In other words, in a large-N 
analysis, it is exceedingly hard to ensure the “everything else being equal” part of comparing support 
cross-nationally
3. 
This paper addresses these issues by taking advantage of the natural quasi-experimental 
research opportunity created by German unification. By historical accident, we are given the unique 
opportunity to analyze the development of public support for two courts (the ECJ and the national 
Constitutional Court, the Bundesverfassungsgericht (BVG)) as both old, established and 
young/emergent courts simultaneously, by comparing the nature, levels and development of support 
for those institutions in West Germany to those in East Germany. In doing so, this paper adds to the 
existing literature on support for the European Court of Justice in three main ways:  
(1)  The statistical analysis of support for the ECJ is based upon two German ALLBUS 
datasets from 1994 and 2000. These datasets have the advantage of containing questions 
on both the national and the supranational courts and of allowing a comparison across a 
longer period of time.  
(2)  This paper complements the customary statistical analysis of support for Constitutional 
Courts with rich, contextualizing focus group data collected in Germany in 2002. Surveys 
tend to be high on external validity and thus permit generalizable statistical inference, but 
even those researchers who can afford the luxury of conducting their own survey and 
asking the questions they really wish they could ask
4 (rather than having to rely on the 
more common secondary data analyses) run the risk of being relatively weak on internal 
validity. However, a multi-method approach (presented here) that combines externally 
valid statistical analysis with a rich qualitative analysis of focus group interviews that is 
high on internal validity provides a more balanced approach to understanding public 
opinion
5. In addition, the insights gained from the right contextual analysis can then be 
used to enhance the design of survey questions.  
(3)  The unique quasi-experimental research design allows to hold “everything else equal” as 
much as possible, as the institutions citizens do or do not trust are literally identical. Yet 
East and West Germany provide two different, yet not completely dissimilar contexts for 
judging support towards constitutional courts. 
Germany is a particularly interesting case to study in this context, not only because it offers a 
quasi-experimental setup, but also because Germans trust the European Court of Justice far more than 
                                                 
2   The former are publicly available as Eurobarometer 38.0 “The European Court of Justice” (ICPSR study no. 6044) and 
Eurobarometer 40.0 “Poverty and Social Exclusion” (ICPSR study no. 6360). The re-interview follow-up survey to EB 
38.0, i.e. the dataset that contains the national court data, is not publicly available. 
3   See for instance Gibson and Caldeira and Baird’s difficulty in selecting comparable courts for their cross-national 
analysis (1998: 346-47). 
4   Gibson and Caldeira once again are an exception to the rule, as they obtained grants to conduct their own surveys on 
support for the ECJ (Caldeira and Gibson 1995, 1997, Gibson and Caldeira 1993, 1995, 1996, 1998, 1998). 
5   See Hibbing and Theiss-Morse (1995, 2002) for two excellent examples of how insightful and powerful such an 
approach can be. 
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Europeans do on average (Hanßen and Holst 2002: 23). Maybe not coincidentally, (West) Germany 
also ranks far above-average than other European countries for diffuse support of their national 
constitutional court, the Bundesverfassungsgericht – even surpassing levels of support for the U.S. 
Supreme Court (c.f. table 4 in Gibson, Caldeira et al. 1998: 351). There is thus prima facie evidence to 
believe that support for the national and supranational court might be interconnected. 
TRIAL ONE: ANALYZING THE SURVEYS 
In the first layer of this analysis, the focus will be on survey data and how they can help us 
understand the sources of trust for national and supranational constitutional courts. The analyses of 
trust in constitutional courts in this section of the paper is based upon the German Allgemeine 
Bevölkerungsumfrage der Sozialwissenschaften (ALLBUS) surveys. In particular, data from the 1994 
and 2000 waves of the survey series
6 are analyzed since they contain questions about trust in various 
institutions, including the Bundesverfassungsgericht and the European Court of Justice.  
However, before delving further into the question of the sources of institutional trust, the 
concept of trust itself needs to be clarified. Ultimately, researchers worry about a court’s levels of 
public support because they are concerned about compliance with controversial decisions. Hence this 
analysis focuses on diffuse support, or institutional trust and legitimacy, as conceptualized by Easton 
(1965, 1975). According to Easton, every institution needs a certain store of diffuse support, or a 
“reservoir of favorable attitudes or good will that helps members to accept or tolerate outputs to which 
they are opposed or the effects of which they see as damaging to their wants” (1965: 273). So when 
respondents are asked about trust in the various institutions, they are asked about their trust in these 
bodies as institutions, tapping what is commonly known as diffuse support for the institution. 
The Visibility of the Courts 
One of the preconditions of trust in and support for an institution is awareness of the 
institution, since citizens can hardly be truly supportive of something about which they know nothing. 
Some analysts (e.g. Gibson and Caldeira 1998) even insist on excluding respondents who profess no 
awareness of institutions from their analysis of support. Unfortunately, the ALLBUS surveys 
contained no awareness item for the Courts. However, it is possible to infer relative levels of visibility 
for the Courts by examining how many newspaper stories mention the Courts. The more stories the 
newspapers run on the institutions, the greater is the likelihood that citizens are aware of the 
institution. 
Figure 1 displays the number of newspaper articles over time in the national German newsdaily 
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ)
7 that mention the Bundesverfassungsgericht and European 
                                                 
6   The data were made available by the Zentralarchiv für Empirische Sozialforschung (ZA) in Cologne, Germany. The 
data were extracted from the ALLBUS cumulative file (1980-2002) which is available from the ZA as study no. 1795.  
7   Despite its regional base in Frankfurt, the FAZ is the leading and most well-respected German daily newspaper, 
occupying a position similar to that of the New York Times is the United States. The FAZ has an approximate 
circulation of 400,000 copies (based on 2004 data available on the paper’s website at 
http://www.faz.net/IN/INtemplates/faznet/default.asp?suchzeitraum=3&term=auflage&Go.x=0&Go.y=0&tpl=commo
n%2Fsuche_erg.asp). 
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Court of Justice. It also presents data for various other national and supranational institutions
8 in order 
to provide a frame of reference (though the time series are incomplete for these)
9. 
[INSERT FIGURE 1 APPROXIMATELY HERE] 
As is clearly evident, the Bundesverfassungsgericht has consistently received greater coverage 
than the European Court of Justice. In 1994, for instance, the Bundesverfassungsgericht was 
mentioned in just under 1000 newspaper stories, while the European Court of Justice was covered in 
only a handful of stories. In the late 1990s, however, newspaper coverage of the Court of Justice 
improved dramatically, coming respectably close to the reporting levels of the national Court by 2000. 
Thus it seems safe to assume that the ECJ was a much more visible institution in 2000 than in 1994.  
When the coverage levels of the two courts are compared to those of the other institutions of 
national government, however, the dominance in newspaper reporting of the legislative and executive 
branches of government becomes readily apparent. While the Bundesverfassungsgericht only rarely 
surpasses the mark of 1000 stories a year, the legislative and executive are routinely covered in four to 
six thousand stories. Equally striking is the relative dearth of coverage of the other European 
institutions. The national struggles between the legislative and executive branches of government is the 
clear and consistent focus of political reporting in the FAZ. 
Nonetheless, the visibility of the two courts should not be underestimated. It is easy to assume 
that this relatively small number of stories would be drowned out by the wave of stories on the other 
institutions. However, it is important to keep in mind that Court decisions can be very controversial, 
such as the Bundesverfassungsgericht’s “crucifix judgment” in 1995 or the proceedings before the 
Constitutional Court (Parteiverbotsverfahren) to outlaw the National-democratic Party of Germany 
(NPD) as an unconstitutional neo-Nazi party in 2000/2001 (note the associate peaks in reporting). 
The Development of Trust in Constitutional Courts 
Now that the relative visibility of the institutions has been established it is time to examine the 
dependent variable, i.e., the levels of trust in the Bundesverfassungsgericht and the ECJ in 1994 and 
how they changed by 2000. Since West Germans have had decades to develop trust towards these 
institutions whereas East Germany has had much less time to do so, it makes sense to begin the 
analysis by examining trust in West Germany first. Figure two therefore presents a comparison of the 
West German mean trust levels
10 in the national and supranational institutions over time. Trust levels 
in 1994 and 2000 are grouped together for each variable in order to permit easy comparison of the 
development over time of trust. 
[INSERT FIGURE 2 APPROXIMATELY HERE] 
As far as overall levels of support are concerned, the Bundesverfassungsgericht stands out as 
the most trusted institution, followed by the ECJ. These two are the only institutions to boast mean 
trust scores that are on the trusting side of the scale, i.e. higher than the middle category of four on the 
seven-point trust scale. The national legislative and executive are slightly more trusted than their 
                                                 
8   National institutions are depicted with black lines, while supranational ones are characterized by gray ones. 
9 The author gratefully acknowledges the tireless and dedicated work of her graduate research assistant Gregory May, who 
compiled the data for 1999-2004. 
10   The survey measures trust in institutions on a scale ranging from 1 “no trust at all” to 7 “very much trust.” 
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European counterparts, though all have mean levels of trust that indicate a lack of trust. Overall, the 
supranational institutions mirror the national pattern, but at a slightly lower, less trusting support level. 
When we turn to a comparison of trust over time, interesting differences emerge. While levels 
of trust in the European Parliament and Commission, as well as trust in the Federal Government are 
almost identical in 1994 and 2000 (mean trust varies between 0% and 2% for these institutions), the 
other institutions have undergone more dramatic trust changes. The Bundesverfassungsgericht has lost 
almost 5% of its (previously very high) mean trust, while the Bundestag, the Federal Parliament has 
had to cope with an even steeper decline in trust of 7% from its relatively lower level of trust. During 
the same time period, however, the European Court of Justice has managed to increase its trust levels 
by a respectable 6%, making it the only institution to improve its mean trust level between 1994 and 
2000. This is quite remarkable. 
How did mean trust levels develop in East Germany during this same time period? Figure 3 
depicts the East German trust levels for 1994 and 2000. 
[INSERT FIGURE 3 APPROXIMATELY HERE] 
It should be noted that overall trust levels are lower in East Germany than they were in the 
West. Furthermore, trust bars are more similar to each other across the board, indicating that East 
Germans do not yet differentiate the different institutions as much as their Western counterparts do. 
Once again, trust in the Bundesverfassungsgericht stands out as the highest bar, with the European 
Court of Justice coming in as a clear second. However, the only institution to score trust beyond the 
neutral scale midpoint at four is the Bundesverfassungsgericht in 2000. Clearly, East Germans are still 
much less trustful of all institutions than Westerners are.  
Notwithstanding the lower levels of trust and generally lower levels of institutional trust 
differentiation in the East, the data once again indicate fascinating developments of trust over time. In 
East Germany, the national and supranational legislative bodies, as well as the European Commission 
have experienced rather stable levels of mean trust (with insignificant variations ranging from -3% for 
the Commission to +2% for the Bundestag). In stark contrast to this stability is the impressive increase 
of trust in both the European Court of Justice (+11%) and even more dramatically, in the Bundes-
verfassungsgericht (+16%). Evidently, both Constitutional Courts have benefited from a sizeable surge 
of trust in the East. 
The Sources of Trust in Constitutional Courts 
What explains these high levels of trust in the Bundesverfassungsgericht and the European 
Court of Justice? It is now time to proceed to a multivariate analysis of trust in those two institutions. 
Due to space and data considerations, an analysis of the 2000 data only is presented below
11. 
The literature on support for constitutional courts indicates a number of likely candidates for 
sources of support and trust
12. Caldeira and Gibson identify attitudes towards democracy and the rule 
of law as crucial elements of support for the ECJ (1995). Unfortunately, the survey contained no data 
                                                 
11   See Grosskopf (1999) for a statistical analysis of the 1994 data. The results of both analyses are fundamentally 
comparable, even though I do not have the space to discuss some of the extant differences between the two here. 
12   It goes almost without saying that it is important to control for a variety of socio-demographic background variables, 
i.e. the ‘usual suspects’ such as age, gender, level of education, household income, as well as religiosity. 
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on attitudes towards the law
13, but it did contain a series of questions that elicit respondents’ 
preferences of security (law and order, as well as economic; v96-99) over freedom of speech and 
citizen control over the government. Answers to those questions are combined in the Inglehart index 
that commonly refers to post-materialist value orientations (v100). This variable is included in the 
models in order to tap general law-related attitudes. Furthermore, the survey featured a question about 
satisfaction with democracy (v17) that is also been included in the model. In addition, two indicators 
of anomy were included in the models: one dummy variable asking whether respondents though 
politicians were uninterested in what common folk want (v350); and one dummy variable asking 
whether respondents though people in general could be trusted (v352). 
Another important source of diffuse support for the Courts could be specific support for them, 
that is agreement with the judgments/policies that they have produced (see for instance Gibson, 
Caldeira et al. 1998). Once again the questions the ALLBUS has to offer are less than ideal, forcing the 
common replacement of  respondent’s ideology (v19) for specific support (c.f. Campbell 2004 for a 
successful example of such a substitution).  
Furthermore, since Constitutional Courts derive their justifications for judgments from their 
respective constitutions, the models include questions about pride in the Constitution (v183)
14. Since 
Carey showed that national loyalties can stand in the way of European attachments (2002), various 
national and supranational attachment/pride variables have also been added to the model. They explore 
respondents’ connection to Germany as a whole (i.e., the current political system; v211), the old 
FRG/GDR (v209/210; to measure attachment to the respective pre-unification political systems) and 
the European Union (v212). In addition, the model also controls for general pride to be German 
(v193), as such pride may prevent attachment to the European institutions. 
Another complex of variables deals with the impact of utilitarian evaluations of the economic 
situation on institutional support. Since Campbell clearly showed that in the case of re-unified 
Germany, economic evaluations outperform civic culture models as predictors of institutional support 
(2004), variables gauging the respondents’ judgments of their personal (v11) and the country’s (i.e. 
sociotropic; v9) economic situation. An additional dummy variable indicates whether a respondent is 
unemployed or not, as this also has the potential of affecting institutional trust. 
Finally, trust in both the national institutions (for all) and the other supranational institutions 
(only for supranational) is included in the models. This choice is based on David Easton concept of an 
“interconnected support universe” laid out in one of his lesser-known articles (1976). In his 
conceptualization of diffuse support, Easton clearly rejects the notion that it is justifiable to regard 
support for one institution as independent of support for other institutions within the system, and for 
the system as a whole. Alternatively, he suggests a “tightly interconnected support universe” in which 
support for one institution depends on support for other institutions of government. While Easton’s 
considerations were exclusively theoretical, there is empirical evidence from the United States that 
support for Congress and the Presidency does influence support for the Supreme Court (Luck 1984), a 
phenomenon sometimes referred to as the “presidential association” (see for instance Casey 1975). 
                                                 
13   However, the survey contains in a different split version (unfortunately it is the Computer Assisted split version 1, a 
variant that does not contain the crucial trust questions for the European institutions) a question about agreement with 
a statement that laws must always be obeyed, regardless of whether one agrees with them or not (v389). I intend to 
estimate for future versions of this paper the “must obey laws regardless” variable for the CAPI 2 and PAPI (paper and 
pencil interview) variants of the survey that also have the European institutional trust questions.  
14   This is a dummy variable indicating whether the respondent mentioned the constitution as one of the four things to be 
proud of out of a battery of items. 
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Recent research by Hibbing and Theiss-Morse (2001) squares well with the notion of an 
interconnected support universe. Even though they analyze the dire public image of the U.S. Congress, 
their findings add a crucial facet to the nature of institutional trust in general and trust in Constitutional 
Courts in particular : Hibbing and Theiss-Morse conclude that the low trust scores of Congress derive 
mostly from unfavorable process evaluations and not as much from policy evaluations as previously 
thought (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 2001). Members of Congress are widely perceived as being 
selfish, personally benefiting from their decisions. This leads Hibbing and Theiss-Morse to speculate 
that the Supreme Court is held in high regard in large part because the Justices are thought not to 
benefit personally from their decisions (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 2002: 158). It therefore seems 
plausible that the link between trust in national and supranational constitutional courts could be a 
shared favorable process evaluation, as both institutions are perceived as fundamentally similar. If 
support for the supranational court is different from support for the national court, on the other hand, 
the varying evaluations might well stem from differing process evaluations of courts. Even in this case, 
however, if the supranational court is evaluated along the same dimensions as the national court, at 
least there is the potential for a legitimacy transfer (even though the link right now might indicate but a 
cognitive shortcut), once the supranational court lives up to the standards of the national court. 
Table one presents the results of four separate OLS regressions analyzing trust in the Bundes-
verfassungsgericht and European Court of Justice in West and East Germany respectively.  
[INSERT TABLE 1 APPROXIMATELY HERE] 
The Case of the Bundesverfassungsgericht in West and East Germany 
The analysis begins with an investigation of the sources of trust for the Bundesverfassungs-
gericht in both parts of the country, as the national court provides the baseline for the ECJ. Both the 
West German and East German models perform adequately, explaining a solid 42.5 and 49 percent of 
the variance in trust for the Bundesverfassungsgericht respectively. 
In West Germany, only a small number of variables have a statistically significant impact on 
trust in the Court. Most conspicuously among those, mentioning the Federal Constitution as something 
to be proud of is a significant and strong predictor of trust in the Bundesverfassungsgericht (B=.355). 
In East Germany, however, this variable has no significant impact when everything else is controlled 
for. Trust in the Constitutional Court is not independently drive by pride in the constitution – possibly 
an expression of the fact that East Germans adopted the constitution in a “take it or leave it” decision 
as the economic pressure of a transforming Socialist economy threatened to bankrupt the GDR. 
In both parts of the country, however, almost all inter-institutional trust relationships emerge as 
strong , as well as statistically significant. Even while controlling for everything else, support for the 
Federal Government, Bundestag, and for the Justice system exert an independent impact on trust in the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht, with unstandardized coefficients ranging from a low of .118 
(Bundesregierung) to a high of .279 for the Parliament in the West and a low of .270 (Justice system) 
to a high of .437 (Parliament) in the East. In the East, support for the Federal Government alone does 
not reach statistical significance, thus indicating that Easterners perceive the Government to be part of 
an entirely different trust dimension.
15
                                                 
15   Interestingly, a significant relationship between education and trust also emerges in West Germany, but not in East 
Germany. Only in the West are more educated citizens also more likely to trust the Court, while in the East trust is 
independent of education levels. Equally interesting is the fact that in West Germany, trust in the Court is gendered 
(i.e., women feel significantly less trusting towards the Court than men) while no such gender gap emerges in the East. 
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The Case of the European Court of Justice in West and East Germany 
The models predicting trust in the European Court of Justice perform even better than the 
national models, as they explain a remarkable 62.9 and 59.2 percent of the variance in West and East 
Germany respectively. Again, most of this variance is explainable through just a small number of 
independent variables.  
Once again, the strongest impact comes from inter-institutional trust connections. In West 
Germany and East Germany, the strongest predictor is the average trust in the European Commission 
and Parliament.
16 The second strongest factor explaining trust in the ECJ is trust in the national court, 
the Bundesverfassungsgericht with a coefficient of .253 and .230 in West and East Germany 
respectively. Trust in the Justice system is significantly associated with higher trust in the ECJ in the  
West (B=.137), but this link is apparently not being made in the East. Furthermore, in West Germany, 
trust in the national parliament leads to slightly lower support for the ECJ (B=-.098), i.e., to a 
nationalization of support. Once again, the East German data fail to show a comparable connection.  
A feeling of connectedness with the EU and its citizens does produce higher trust in the ECJ in 
the West only (B=.146), but once again the effect fails to materialize in the East. East Germans do 
manifest a similar symptom, though, in that in the East only, expressions of generalized national pride 
translate into lower trust in the ECJ (B=-.189). In the West, no such relationship is significant.
17 A few 
other variables barely approach statistical significance (p<.1; pride in the Constitution in West 
Germany, the anomy items in East Germany), but the relationships are tenuous enough to justify 
resisting the urge to interpret them. 
Overall, the evidence thus suggests Easton and Hibbing and Theiss-Morse appear to be on the 
right track with their theories, even though it does not fully explain exactly why and how people make 
the inter-institutional connections (functional or cognitive shortcuts?) or why they fail to make it.  
So after analyzing the surveys, three main questions require further investigation with richer, 
qualitative data: 
1)  Why do people trust constitutional courts so much more than they trust the 
other institutions of government? 
2)  How and why do people make the connection between national and 
supranational courts? 
3)  What differences (if any) are there between the nature of the trust connection in 
East and West Germany? 
                                                 
16   Respondents did not appear to differentiate between the two institutions very much as indicated by a Pearson’s 
correlation coefficient of over .85. This created multicollinearity problems that necessitated the creation of an average 
score for the two institutions. 
17 Perhaps this is an expression of the fact that while West Germans developed an aversion to nationalism due to post 
WWII re-education efforts, as the FRG considered itself the successor state to the Third Reich. The GRD, on the other 
hand, developed its national identity based on the anti-fascist roots of its Communist/Socialist heritage and thus never 
took responsibility for the atrocities of the Third Reich. 
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TRIAL TWO: ANALYSING THE FOCUS GROUPS 
In the second layer of analysis, I will explore a series of focus group interviews in order to 
answer the questions posited above. Focus groups
18 are especially valuable as part of a multi-method 
approach. They are then used, as in this case, to provide additional, rich data against which a 
hypothesis is tested. While care must be taken in interpreting the results in order to avoid overstating 
external validity (Merton, Fiske et al. 1990: xxi), they are well-suited to following up previous 
research with very specific open-ended questions. According to Denzin and Lincoln (1994: 365) this is 
exactly the type of research situation for which Merton coined the phrase “focus group.” 
In a focus group, a small group (approximately 6-10 people) of homogeneous participants is 
convened. It is important that participants feel comfortable enough with the other participants to 
become a part of the group. Therefore members need to be relatively similar to each other. The 
researcher uses a discussion guide outlining the questions that will be asked during the interview. 
However, deviations from the guide commonly occur, as each discussion develops its own dynamics.  
In this case, due to the quasi-experimental research design, two sets of focus group interviews 
were conducted: one set in West Germany, another set in East Germany. College students are a 
particularly interesting population to conduct such focus group interviews with. Not only are they 
readily available (recruitment of focus group participants can be both difficult and costly), but they 
tend to be more articulate than the average population. In addition, for East Germany, i.e., for the 
“new” courts, college students represent one of the youngest politically aware population groups that 
have been socialized into the current political system. Older generations likely have received their 
primary political socialization pre-unification, thus potentially muddying the results with attachments 
to the previous political system. If no functional connection can be found in this population, i.e. if the 
null hypothesis cannot even be rejected for the ‘most likely suspect,’ we can be all the more confident 
that the hypothesis is incorrect and that no relationship exists. If, on the other hand, a functional 
connection does emerge, further investigation is warranted.  
The West German focus group interviews were conducted at the University of Mainz in the 
state of Rhineland-Palatinate, and the East German ones at the University of Erfurt in the state of 
Thuringia.
 19 Both universities are located in cities of similar size (around 200 000 inhabitants) and 
both are located in their respective state capitals. Fundamental similarities (both cultural and 
economic) between the two cities led to a twinning arrangement in 1988. The cities and states 
                                                 
18   The focus group technique goes back to the work of the social scientist Robert Merton, who used it to analyze 
audience reactions to World War II morale films (Stewart and Shamdasani 1990). It is essentially a reaction to the 
forced structure that surveys and highly structured interviews imposed on respondents. Its primary advantage is that it 
allows participants to freely define the meaning of her or his comments. Through group interactions, respondents are 
able and supposed to influence each other in order to reveal underlying meaning and connections that they make. As 
Lewis (Lewis 1995: 2) put it: “It [the focus group interview, A.G.] taps into human tendencies where attitudes and 
perceptions are developed through interaction with other people. During a group discussion, individuals may shift due 
to the influence of other comments. 
19   The research at the University of Mainz and the University of Erfurt were made possible through the gracious support 
and hospitality of Professor Dittgen in Mainz and Professor Herz in Erfurt. I would also like to thank all of the staff 
members at both universities for making my stay both enjoyable and efficient. Without their logistical support, this 
research would not have been possible.  
Two preliminary focus group interviews were conducted at the University of Mainz, Germany, on February 1, 2001. 
The main set of focus groups was conducted at the University of Mainz on June 3, 2002 and at the University of Erfurt 
on June 7, 2002. Each session lasted roughly two hours and was conducted in a room at the respective University. 
Each group contained from 3-14 participants. 
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represent neither the richest area of Germany, nor the poorest. They both share a relatively central 
geographical position within the country. As such, they are well suited for a comparison.  
German citizenship was a prerequisite for participation in the focus group interviews
20. A 
further requirement was that participants were born and raised in the old and the new German states for 
the West and East German interviews respectively. These requirements were necessary, as only 
citizens’ views towards their political system were of interest.  
All group discussions followed basically the same format. Moderation of the group was based 
upon a discussion outline that had been prepared in advance.
21 Though not all questions were asked in 
the same order in each group, depending on the discussion dynamics, almost all of the questions were 
covered by both groups at one point or another. Both discussions began by exploring what respondents 
are proud of as Germans and then proceeded to what they thought the institutions should be doing right 
now and whether they are doing it or not. In a next step, participants were asked to evaluate which 
institution had the most power. Then, discussion proceeded to evaluations of trust in the Federal 
Constitutional Court compared to the other institutions. This same structure was then repeated for the 
European institutions, including the European Court of Justice. 
Given the quasi-experimental research design, it is imperative to analyze the West German and 
East German data separately, so that communalities and similarities become readily apparent. Since we 
already know more about established courts than about emergent ones, and since they will serve as the 
baseline for comparison, the West German focus groups will be analyzed first. 
The West German Case: Established National v Emergent Supranational Court 
Discussion in all groups was quite lively. Even though all groups reacted to the questions in 
slightly different ways, a number of common themes emerged from the discussions. The first complex 
of communalities concerns the way participants perceived government and parliament. It was quite 
evident that all participants had clear ideas of which problems they wanted the Federal Government 
and Parliament to tackle. A number of current buzzwords of the political debate ranging from right 
wing extremism, unemployment, pension reform, perceived inflation due to the introduction of the 
Euro, all the way to trust in government were brought up.  
Constitutional Court v the Other Institutions 
It was striking during discussion, that participants did not perceive the government and 
parliament as tackling the main problems of the day effectively. They did see activities regarding these 
problems, but they were generally judged to be blind and mindless activism designed to give the 
illusion of actual solutions. Ideological differences and partisan squabbles and mudslinging with an 
eye to the next election were cited as causes that prevent consensus that would lead to true solutions to 
the problems from emerging. Ironically enough, the mechanics of democracy and the ensuing 
discussions are being held against these institutions. Instead of representing interests, participants 
mainly expected leadership and problem solving capabilities from the overtly political institutions. 
Maybe it is unsurprising that this image squares quite well with Hibbing and Theiss-Morse’s findings 
on the U.S. Congress (1995). In the eyes of participants, the government and the legislature were 
                                                 
20   A complete description of the recruitment process and group characteristics/composition is available from the author 
upon request.  
21   A copy of the moderated discussion outline can be obtained from the author upon request. 
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simply engaging in a more or less futile process of wanting to appear effective at solving problems, 
without actually doing so. Again, the similarity to Hibbing and Theiss-Morse’s recent findings 
concerning the negative process evaluations as a reason for distrusting the U.S. Congress (2001) is 
quite striking. 
A second complex of communalities emerged around perceptions of the Federal Constitutional 
Court. The Court was seen as quite a contrast to the other, squabbling institutions of government. 
Participants in all West German groups cited four main interrelated reasons for their trust. First, the 
institution is viewed as passive/reactive and only potentially and temporarily powerful. Comments 
relating to this point are well represented by the following two remarks:
22  
Participant 11 (male): “It is not its task to exercise power.” 
Participant 9 (male): “Power in a political sense is not vested in the Court by the constitution, so you 
need to exclude that aspect.” 
Second, the Constitutional Court is seen as staffed with highly competent professionals and 
good democrats. The following sampling of comments illustrates this line of argument well: 
Participant 1(male):”They [the Federal Constitutional Court, A.G.] are a multifaceted institution where 
everybody specializes on a particular type of law. They are specialists.” 
Participant 5 (male):”They have a high level of competence.” 
Third, the Court is viewed as non-political/non-partisan since it is insulated from political 
and/or public pressures. A few representative comments illustrate this point. A female participant 
(participant 2) succinctly summed the core of the argument up as ”It stays out of small fights and party 
squabbles.” 
Fourth, the Federal Constitutional Court is seen as constrained by the constitution and therefore 
as linked to the common good. One participant put it thus: 
Participant 7 (male): ”There is, well, let me say, a concrete body of rules, right? They [the justices, 
A.G.] need to come to their judgments based on the, well, constitution. In parties it is the cases that 
they represent certain opinions. The Federal Constitutional Court doesn’t have that. They must not be 
subjective, but objective, right? There are rules, and they are being applied to cases and, well, it is 
simply a logical chain of argument.” 
Amazingly, this firm belief in the myth of judicial neutrality even holds up to direct challenge 
from another participant. Even when the participant is alerted to the fact that decisions change and that 
court decisions are a matter of interpretation, he still insists on trusting the court. 
Participant 3 (female) interjects: 
”Excuse me. I think it is a bit subjective because if you compare … uh ...decisions, for instance, from 
… I don’t know … well from the past, then there have well been different decisions.” 
Participant 7 (male) replies: ”Yeah sure, of course, some leeway is certainly there, but it is always the 
case that you can say, ok, well this is the law and we based our decision on that and that you can 
follow that. And for – in politics there are certain opinions, that you say it is liberal, somewhat 
conservative, and well, you cannot really label it right or wrong, but it is always the degree to which it 
coincides with yourself and your inclinations are being valued more.” [Emphasis added] 
Trust in the Federal Constitutional Court emerges here as socialized trust. Participants’ 
judgments are not necessarily based on actual knowledge, however, as participants admit with 
                                                 
22   All translations are the author’s own work, based on focus group transcripts. The author owes special thanks to Romy 
Langeheine at the University of Erfurt for transcribing the East German focus groups, as well as to Vanessa 
Habermann and Tatjana Kober at C.W. Post University for transcribing the West German focus groups. 
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surprising candor. Almost everybody keeps repeating, “at least I hope so….” It is interesting to note 
that due to the respondents’ socialized basic propensity for trust, the absence of negative news is taken 
as an affirmation of their basic trust. 
Participant 8 (male): His trust in the FCC is highest of the three institutions “perhaps because you 
hardly ever hear of it. […] Your really never hear of failures.” 
Furthermore, it is interesting that to note that participants are quite aware of the fact that their 
trust is related to the nature of the court:  
Participant 4 (female): “Well, I somehow have a kind of … I don’t know … some kind of basic trust in 
the Federal Constitutional Court and I don’t necessarily have that in the parties because they simply – 
well, um – I basically assume that the Justices of the Federal Constitutional Court, well that they 
succeed [in staying non-political and true to the constitution, A.G.]. I can’t control them, either, but if 
they really are like this, if they really are democratic, and then they really make their decisions so that 
they would be best for the people. And for parties I do not assume that because I currently see that 
some parties completely oppose my views, for instance. And so it cannot possibly be, well, the best for 
everyone. But I connect it [the Federal Constitutional Court, A.G.] much more with such democratic 
values than I connect parties because some parties exist that don’t stand for democratic values, or for 
values that I don’t suit me. And – it is quite obvious, because the Federal … the parties – they are – 
they articulate actively and the Federal Constitutional Court is only passive. That means it is only 
called upon and so there are many more opportunities for me to be cross with those parties somehow. 
But somehow it cannot really be justified.” … 
The participants’ deeply internalized, socialized trust in the Constitutional Court appears close 
to unshakable. When asked to imagine the worst possible decision the Court could make, they had 
difficulties to imagine the Court making ANY kind of bad decision. For as long as they could find 
some sort of halfway reasonable interpretation of constitutional provisions, they were willing to 
acquiesce to any kind of judgment. Only if the Court openly disregarded fundamental human rights 
would they be willing to stand up to it and protest. In contrast to the Federal Constitutional Court, 
however, the other institutions of government were seen as slaves of the voter and the media. Table 2 
summarizes the findings for the German national institutions of government in West Germany. 
[INSERT TABLE 2 APPROXIMATELY HERE] 
European Court of Justice v Bundesverfassungsgericht 
Notwithstanding the varied opinions within the groups, it was striking to note that virtually all 
participants, regardless of their level of trust in the European Court of Justice, DID make the functional 
connection between the national and supranational constitutional court. However, the strength of the 
connection did vary across individuals, as did the nature of the argument. The tenor of opinion was 
that overall, members of the ECJ are seen as judges and are consequently accorded trust. There was 
SOME DEGREE of legitimacy transfer for almost all participants, but it varied according to the 
interaction of two factors (see Table 3):  
1) The perceived differences between themselves and the rest of Europe and 
2) mitigating factors that allowed participants to tolerate difference. 
[INSERT TABLE 3 APPROXIMATELY HERE] 
Respondents who generally view the values represented in the Court and other European 
systems and cultures as alien and remote trust the ECJ less than even the national government. 
Participant 7 (male): “The problem with the European institutions is that they do not only take German 
values, and -- yeah, German priorities into account, but that you always have to find some compromise 
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which is somehow acceptable for all European member states. And because of that I find myself 
saying that I trust the Federal Government more because I know that they only take into account 
traditional values and the – whatever – basic ethical rules with which I can somehow identify, that are 
dominant in our culture. There are certain differences within Europe, after all.” 
Other participants clearly recognized differences to other Europeans, but their overriding 
support for European integration enables them to tolerate displeasing outcomes. 
Participant 8 (male): “I have equally strong trust [in both courts, A.G.] because I, well, think that there, 
too, decisions are being made based on the law and secured through the law. Only I have to say yes, 
there sometimes are decisions that the Germans brought to the Court, I mean a case that the Germans 
have taken to court, which is then being decided for the benefit of Germany, or it corresponds more to 
Germany’s point of view. Sometimes the result corresponds more closely to the views of the 
Mediterranean countries or something like that. Then you have to, as he said, give in to that or you 
even have to acquiesce to it, yes. But viewed in the long run, this is certainly good, because everyone 
gains and loses sometime, uhm, and only in this fashion can a way to integration be found. I have 
complete trust in that.” 
Another striking finding was the extreme to which some participants were willing to push the 
skills argument. Those individuals who had most internalized the view that the justices’ competence 
was the primary reason for trusting them were even willing to trust the European Court of Justice more 
than the Federal Constitutional Court Those participants did not even bother to mention differences. 
Participant 3 (female):”Well, if you extend the Federal Constitutional Court – that the best judges in 
Germany are on the Federal Constitutional Court, then the European Court of Justice would have to 
have the best judges of all of Europe. And then, I would personally say, I trust the European Court of 
Justice more than the Federal Government. As for [the trust comparison with, A.G.] the Federal 
Constitutional Court, well, I’m not quite sure right now, perhaps, yes, equally or similarly, because I 
simply think that – it is untouchable. The government are, well, I don’t know, completely normal 
people like you and me, I think, well, they are just human, but for me, the judges are more like, well 
for me somehow on a higher level. […] As I said, I’m not well-informed enough in order to really say. 
It is simply a kind of feeling, but I don’t have real information.” 
Participants also made it clear, however, that similarly to the national court, their thoughts were 
not necessarily based on detailed knowledge. This is a strong indicator that trust in the European Court 
of Justice grows out of the deeply socialized trust in the Federal Constitutional Court. In that sense, 
both the functional and the cognitive hypotheses appear to apply. It has to be noted, however, that 
support based on a cognitive shortcut will likely be more easily eroded than truly socialized support. 
The East German Case: Emergent National v Emergent Supranational Court 
Participants in the East German focus groups were easily able as their Western counterparts to 
recite a whole litany of current political problems that they thought ought to be tackled. Clearly, none 
of the participants in any of the focus groups – not even the ones who said they had very low interest 
in and knowledge of politics – thought that there were no urgent issues to be addressed. In the East 
German groups, the main current problems had a slightly different focus than those Westerners 
perceived, though. In the East, as in the West, the rising prices due to the Euro conversion were an 
urgent problem participants wanted to see addressed by the political institutions. In addition, however, 
concerns included unemployment, corruption, taxes and the budget deficit, a fair distribution of wealth, 
and the restructuring of the economic system. The Euro-effects clearly were a national debate, while 
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more fundamental perceptions of injustices within society emerged as the central complaint in East 
Germany.
23  
Constitutional Court v the Other Institutions 
When respondents were asked to specify which institutions should address these issues, one 
readily apparent difference between East and West Germans was that where West Germans were 
almost unanimous in assigning the problem-solving responsibility to the overtly political institutions, 
rather than the Constitutional Court, participants in the Eastern groups were slightly more willing to 
take the Court to task, as well. However, this was mainly due to the perception that the legislative 
process was in danger of failing
24 and the Court would now be required to step in to rectify the 
situation. At the same time, no implied worry about the Court living up to the occasion was noticeable 
– quite in contrast to the perceived likelihood that the other problems would be solved to participants’ 
satisfaction.  
It most other respects, the similarities to Western perceptions of the Constitutional Court 
compared to the other institutions of government were overwhelming. Participants expected the Court 
to step in and defend the constitution when other political actors had failed to do so. Just as in the 
West, most participants saw the Court as overwhelmingly trustworthy, because it was seen as isolated 
from the corrupting pressures of special interests and parties, while simultaneously being constrained 
by the constitution. Even when a participant was reminded that seats on the Federal Constitutional 
Court are filled according to party quotas, participants insisted on the justices’ impartiality.  
Participant 39 (male): “Ok, at that moment [when the justice joins the bench, A.G.] he has to sit on the 
Federal Constitutional Court – and there partisan affiliation no longer plays a role.” 
Moderator: “Do they check it at the door, or what?” 
Participant 39: “Yes, they are then really independently responsible only as a Constitutional Justice. 
Then any sorts of interests no longer play a role.”  
In addition, East German participants shared the Western counterparts’ view that the Court was 
trustworthy as an institution that has to come to the rescue when the other institutions fail, without 
being able to initiate steps on its own. When another respondent suggested the Federal Constitutional 
Court step in and institute more equitable criminal penalties (which as a Kelsenian constitutional court, 
it cannot do), a more informed participant replied with a reason why the Court cannot solve problems: 
Participant 49 (female):”And the problem is that with the Federal Constitutional Court (inaudible, 
A.G.) they only can regulate something when something else has already gone wrong. This is always 
an ex-post affair. Something always has to happen first. Then somebody must sue. This must then be 
so grave that – ok, something will be changed now. And then something happens. That is the point, 
though: they [the Justices, A.G.] cannot decide something in advance at their own discretion.” 
                                                 
23   Given its Socialist history, East Germany tends to lean more towards left ideologies. In addition, questions of social 
justice and distribution of wealth are a greater concern to East Germans simply because the new states are less well to 
do than the old states. So this perceptions of current problems was to be expected. 
24   The respondent was referring to the Immigration Law, which was quite contentious at the time. It was proposed by the 
Social Democratic/Green coalition government. After relatively smooth passage in the Federal Diet (Bundestag), 
passage in the Christian Democrat-dominated Federal Council (Bundesrat) was questionable. It was widely expected 
that even if the law were to pass, it would be challenged before the Constitutional Court. The law was indeed 
challenged before the Bundes¬verfassungs¬gericht later that year and struck down by the Court on procedural 
grounds (the state of Brandenburg had not cast its votes en bloc, as constitutionally required). A revised version of the 
law was finally passed in the summer of 2004 and took effect on January 1 of 2005. 
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Participants in the East also agreed that the Constitutional Court was a neutral institution that 
did not stand for particular interests. To the extent that they do take sides, Justices are seen as taking 
the side of the law and the constitution, not as imposing their own interests. After saying that she 
trusted the Constitutional Court more than politicians and saw them as more trustworthy because they 
are never visible in the media trying to gain support for their personal viewpoint, participant 49 
explained why she thought Constitutional Justices do not seek the media limelight: 
 Participant 49 (female): “They [Constitutional Justices, A.G.] represent their opinion, but they always 
represent the opinion of the law – I don’t know how to express this. In politics, this is different. […]  
And I think that they also make decisions there [at the Federal Constitutional Court, A.G.] that are free 
from personal value judgments. I do think that they simply see their position and then they judge 
according to the law. And [I think, A.G.] that the responsibility is much greater that it [the decision, 
A.G.] is neutral – and this is different in politics. There, your own opinion is pushed through or not 
pushed through.” 
Table four summarizes the results from East Germany. 
[INSERT TABLE 4 APPROXIMATELY HERE] 
The most significant difference between East and West German views of the Federal 
Constitutional Court is that East German participants did not emphasize the role of expertise as much 
as their Western counterparts. Hence, the table entries were omitted from this table. While expertise 
was occasionally alluded to in side references, the main source of trust in the Federal Constitutional 
Court seemed to derive from the absence of political pressures on the court that led to a perception of 
neutrality. Once again, process evaluations favor the Constitutional Court with respect to the political 
(and arguably more democratic) institutions of government. 
European Court of Justice v Federal Constitutional Court 
If similarities between East and West Germans abound at the national level, the question then 
becomes whether these similarities continue at the supranational level, as well. As discussed above, 
West Germans were – under certain conditions – willing to transfer their trust in the national court to 
the supranational level. Will East Germans be willing to transfer their trust in the Federal 
Constitutional Court to the European Court of Justice? 
The answer is – as in West Germany – it depends. However, there are clear differences in what 
the transfer of legitimacy depends on for East Germans. The first striking finding is that East Germans 
feel very poorly informed about the European Union, even more so than West German participants. At 
the same time, however, a few East German participants had much more detailed knowledge of EU 
affairs than the overwhelming majority of Western participants.
25  
Attitudes towards European integration were also different in both parts of Germany. While 
identification with Europe and the European Union in West Germany was frequently seen in terms of 
creating peace and stability in Europe, East Germans portrayed a different image of “Europeanness.” 
While they did claim to feel European, for East Germans this seemed to be more in a cultural than in a 
political sense. The following comments illustrate this sentiment. 
Participant 40 (female): “I do feel like a European. I feel as if I am in a community in Europe and this 
connects me with other Europeans. This is not necessarily seen politically or something like that, but it 
is [inaudible, A.G.]. I would – if someone asked me if I felt more as a German or more as a European – 
would I feel more like a European, and that I feel a connectedness with the other people. That I do not 
                                                 
25   Mostly, this information concerned aspects of the EU that respondents disliked. 
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distinguish Germans are such and such and French are such and such. I feel connected with the 
people.” 
Participants made clear distinctions between Europe in a cultural sense on the one hand, and 
the European Union on the other hand. For West Germans, the two tended to be inseparable. Clearly, 
Europeanness and the European Union are not synonymous in East Germany. When asked what they 
saw as the main problems facing the European Union, participants therefore tended to name different 
problems, if they felt they had enough information to name specific problems in the first place.  
First and foremost, participants who had enough information to name specific problems 
thought that the EU needs to reform itself and create a true constitution. Right away, the discussion 
became controversial, though, as not all participants thought that a deepening of the European Union 
was desirable aim. For those participants who were in favor of further integration through the 
European Union, however, the most important problem was that the system does not allow for 
sufficient majoritarian decision-making. Further problems concerned the lack of powers for the 
European Parliament. Oddly enough, the first sign of democratic responsibility of the European 
Commission, which resigned after some members had been involved in scandals, was also seen as 
problematic. Overall, respondents who favored European integration wanted more democratic 
accountability, transparency, and more powers for the European Parliament. It should be noted that 
these are not really policy problems, but more fundamental, constitutional problems. While at least 
some of the participants liked the idea of a European Union, they were dissatisfied with the current 
political structure because they perceived a democratic deficit.
26
At least one participant appeared to reject the notion of European integration through the 
European Union (in its current form) altogether. When asked about the most important problems 
currently facing the EU, the participant replied: 
Participant 47 (male): “The problem that the EU thinks that community or a feeling of union can only 
be achieved by harmonizing. I think that is the greatest [expletive deleted, A.G.] that they attempt to 
make all legal systems the same.” 
When challenged by other participants that integration could not be achieved without legal integration, 
the participant replied that he would trust the market more than the EU to take care of things. If 
anything, the only justification for the European Union he could see was to conduct a joint foreign 
policy. To this participant, then, European integration should be a confederation, nothing more. 
Overall, participants associated mostly negative perceptions and emotions in connection with 
the European institutions. The ECJ was no exception to this rule. What was exceptional, however, was 
that one respondent had enough information about the Court to venture the most detailed and case-
based evaluation of the European Court of Justice. The following was his explanation for the greatest 
challenge currently facing the ECJ. 
Participant 39 (male): “Independence from the Advocate General, the European Advocate General. 
When I think of the tobacco story with the formula 1 [racing car league, A.G.] – this was the first time 
so far that a European Advocate General has essentially made a recommendation and the European 
Court of Justice always agrees with it. I find that too transparent. There would have to be a greater 
disentangling [of interests, A.G.]. It cannot be that when the Advocate General makes a 
recommendation even against the Commission – this was the point – against the Commission, and that 
the Court of Justice always follows the petitions of the Advocate General. There must be greater 
                                                 
26   Oddly enough, if the European Union were to create clearer lines of democratic accountability, the experience of the 
national institutions would suggest that the ECJ would stand to benefit more than the political European institutions. 
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disentanglement [of interests, A.G.]. I mean, that is the way it is in any normal court, that the court has 
its own opinion between the public prosecutor and the defense attorney. This seems weird to me.”
27
Even though this participant was quite critical of the ECJ, though, he clearly placed great hopes 
in the institution. When participants were asked what images or ideas they associated with the various 
institutions, the same participant volunteered this answer. 
Participant 39 (male): “In the future […] when we get to the point that the Parliament, as well as the 
Court of Justice, are given more powers, it will automatically be like in the USA in the Supreme Court, 
that one really [takes, A.G.] the trust that one has in the Federal Constitutional Court right now, that 
you transfer it to the Court of Justice.” 
For this participant, then, the negative evaluation of the Court derived from negative process 
evaluations (i.e., the Court as catering to the Advocate General’s interests), NOT from a lack of a 
national presumption of legitimacy. He even expressed a desire for the Court and the European 
Parliament to be given more powers so they could become trustworthier. Interestingly, then, the one 
individual that appeared to trust the ECJ the least is also the one sees a great potential for trust in the 
future, when the Court and the structure of which it is a part is more clearly democratically legitimated 
in his view. Quite clearly, then, the participant makes a functional link between the two courts, even 
though he judges them differently, possibly due to a strong identification with German national 
interests as his comments later on in the discussion indicate.
28  
Most participants found it very difficult to express specific opinions about the European 
institutions. They experienced them to be very remote, cumbersome, hard to get good information 
about, and potentially corrupt. When pressed to venture a comparison despite their lack of information, 
respondents were only willing to express an opinion about the ECJ. 
Participant 40 (female): “You would associate it [the European Union, A.G.] or transfer it as you know 
it from Germany and say: ok, I would grant the European Court of Justice the most competency or 
trust […] and I would essentially transfer the small Germany to the large Germany [the European 
Union, A.G.].” 
The participant took pains to emphasize the hypothetical case, however. In subsequent discussion it 
was repeatedly emphasized that participants felt it was simply too difficult to obtain good information. 
In particular, a lack of information about ECJ judgments was not taken – as in the national case – as 
good news. They felt the Court did not have enough of a track record to warrant their unqualified trust 
just like the national court.  
[INSERT TABLE 5 APPROXIMATELY HERE] 
Other participants who felt they had little information about the ECJ also thought it would be 
the trustworthiest of the European institutions. For two of the participants, the ECJ was perceived as 
more competent than the other institutions for the exact same reasons as the Federal Constitutional 
Court, as the following excerpts demonstrate. 
Participant 49 (female): “Because they bring a certain qualification with them. […]” 
                                                 
27   It should be noted that the institution of Advocate General comes from French law. It is alien to the German legal 
system. Consequently, the term is translated as “Europäischer Staatsanwalt” or literally, European public prosecutor. 
However, the Advocate General’s task is very different from that of a public prosecutor, despite the similarity that the 
German terms seem to imply. This confusion of terms may in part explain the dissatisfaction the participant expressed.  
28   At the end of each group discussion, participants were given an opportunity to make final statements for the record. 
Respondent 47 (male) took the opportunity to add “I really just want to say that from a government, political point of 
view, I would not want to live in any other country on this earth, because I think we have the optimum [political 
system, A.G.]. Except maybe for something in the Scandinavian direction, but in no case anything different.” 
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Participant 48 (female): “Well, because the Court cannot necessarily do what it wants, like for instance 
the Federal Government. I think that this is why it is this way [that the ECJ is more trustworthy than 
the other political institutions, A.G.].” 
Participant 49 even made a greater leap of faith when she said “I think this [the presence of trust in the 
absence of information, A.G.] is connected with the fact that trust has not been disappointed in that 
way. It is roughly like this: Why is Joschka Fischer [the German Foreign Minister, A.G.] so popular? 
He is so popular because he does not do anything wrong. And in this point, when you make a mistake, 
trust is disappointed
29. And when you do not do much, then you do not make many mistakes – and the 
whole European affair is not on the media that much and due to this we do not know that much about 
what they do. [This is why, A.G.] they make even fewer mistakes than for instance the Federal 
government.” 
Clearly, this participant has a presumption of legitimacy for the supranational court just as much as for 
the national court.  
The mechanisms for a functional connection are undoubtedly present in virtually all 
participants. However, different sets of constellations prevent people from making the link. Table five 
summarizes the results. Admittedly, the linkage between support for the national and supranational 
court is weaker in East Germany than in West Germany. Even though trust in the national court 
appears to be well socialized, transfer of this trust is hampered by skepticism about the democratic 
nature of the current European Union or, at least in one case, by fundamental doubts about the 
justification of European integration as such. None of the participants showed the strong version of the 
competence link from the national to the supranational level which led to higher trust scores for the 
supranational court than for the national one. Notwithstanding this difference, even most critics of the 
ECJ appeared to have the fundamental wherewithal to make the legitimacy link once they see greater 
democratic legitimation of the overall political structure of the EU (hence the perceived need to create 
a European constitution). Most participants were in the third category with low information about the 
Court, though, and made at least a tentative legitimacy link.  
CONCLUSION 
Based on the data presented above it is quite clear that people with very different viewpoints do 
make a functional connection between the two levels of courts. This is due to the fact that courts are 
perceived as different, and in many cases, as more successful institutions than the more overtly 
political ones. In a way, expectations towards courts are lower than they are towards the government 
and parliament. After all, one important difference participants cited was that court do not often have 
to deal with political problems. When they do, participants tended to blame this fact on the failure of 
the political process that was originally designed to take care of the problem. Different sets of 
expectations lead to different evaluations. Based on this evidence, the findings of a legitimacy transfer 
from the national to the supranational level were not a methodological artifact. It is also evident that 
people do not know much about the European Court of Justice. This might mean that their support 
does not signify much. By the same token, however, participants freely admitted that they knew very 
little about the Bundesverfassungsgericht. Yet for this court, no researcher is willing to claim that its 
                                                 
29   Even though this sounds strangely prophetic now, this focus group interview was conducted roughly three years before 
Fischer became embroiled in the so-called “visa scandal” that is currently threatening both his popularity, as well as 
his political career. 
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legitimacy is seriously endangered at this time. It may be a cognitive shortcut, but it enables the 
supranational court to tap into a national source of legitimacy. 
Whether participants ended up trusting the European Court of Justice as much as the Federal 
Constitutional Court depended upon a number of mitigating factors, though: attitudes towards 
Europeans and European integration evidently matter. But clearly, as a court, the European Court of 
Justice has some presumption of legitimacy. In West Germany, as well as in East Germany, even 
people who do not trust it that much now see the potential of trusting it in the future, since it is staffed 
with judges and since it operates based on the same principles as the national court. Currently, they are 
just afraid that the legal norms those judges represent are not compatible with German notions of law 
and appropriateness or that the supranational court does not yet operate according to the same 
principles as its national counterpart. In both cases, however, participants clearly did make a functional 
connection between the two courts. 
The findings from these focus group interviews square quite well with notions of a process-
driven evaluation of institutions as advanced by Hibbing and Theiss-Morse (2001). As suspected, 
under many – though not all – circumstances, courts benefit from their more favorable process 
evaluations relative to those of the political institutions. Even though this flies in the face of 
conventional wisdom and democratic theory, citizens hate observing the day-to-day workings of 
democracy. They perceive the representation of interest as standing in the way of the common good 
because they have a rather cynical (though not entirely unwarranted) perception of the democratic 
process. They believe that politicians are in the game for their own benefit. Justices, however, are 
presumed to have more noble motives: the law, the constitution, and overall, the common good 
embodied in it. Under the right conditions, this legitimacy can transfer to the supranational level. This 
study suggests that the right conditions consist of general support for European integration in the form 
of the European Union, and the perception that the ECJ actually follows the same processes as the 
Federal Constitutional Court. For some, presumably extremely well-socialized individuals, even the 
absence of negative information about the ECJ and its decision-making process suffices.  
Overall, the evidence thus support the legitimacy transfer hypothesis, even though it 
complicates the interplay of factors under which such a transfer can be successful. Now the next main 
task is to design process-oriented questions about the courts and to test empirically whether the 
linkages participants in these focus groups exhibited reproduce in the general population or not. If they 
do reproduce, we will then have to gauge which segment of respondents simply extrapolates due to a 
lack of information, i.e. takes a cognitive shortcut, and which parts of the population transfer 
legitimacy in a more durable and substantive sense. The difference between the two categories will be 
crucial for understanding the legitimacy of the European Court of Justice. 
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FIGURE 1: 
The Visibility of National and Supranational Institutions Over Time in the Newsdaily 
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung
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 B Std. Error B Std. Error B Std. Error B Std. Error
(Constant) 1.037 # 0.571 -0.114 0.844 -0.198 0.483 1.539 0.788
Average trust in European Commission and Parliament — — — — 0.672 *** 0.036 0.707 *** 0.049
Trust in the Bundesverfassungsgericht —— —— 0.253 *** 0.034 0.230 *** 0.050
Trust in the Bundesregierung 0.118 ** 0.043 0.077 0.061 0.011 0.037 0.038 0.057
Trust in the Bundestag 0.279 *** 0.046 0.437 *** 0.059 -0.078 * 0.040 -0.036 0.059
Trust in the Justice System 0.266 *** 0.035 0.270 *** 0.049 0.137 *** 0.032 0.009 0.049
Ideology (left-right self-identification) 0.0780 *** 0.028 0.013 0.040 -0.043 # 0.024 -0.034 0.037
Satisfaction with democracy 0.074 0.048 0.181 *** 0.060 0.000 0.040 -0.023 0.057
People can be trusted 0.126 0.115 0.015 0.184 -0.098 0.097 -0.331 # 0.172
Politicians are uninterested in common folks -0.039 0.144 0.106 0.236 -0.077 0.121 -0.386 # 0.221
Inglehart-Index -0.041 0.049 -0.016 0.071 0.039 0.041 -0.101 0.066
Proud of constitution 0.355 *** 0.096 0.170 0.145 0.141 # 0.081 0.053 0.136
General pride to be German -0.100 0.064 0.015 0.083 -0.057 0.054 -0.189 * 0.078
Connection to Germany as a Whole 0.121 0.082 -0.033 0.101 -0.002 0.069 0.036 0.094
Connection to EU and its Citizens -0.023 0.071 0.079 0.095 0.146 * 0.061 0.056 0.092
Connection with old FRG/GDR -0.049 0.069 0.124 0.081 0.032 0.058 0.036 0.076
Respondent's economic situation (very good to bad) -0.062 0.075 -0.098 0.101 0.078 0.063 -0.050 0.094
Economic situation in Germany (very good to bad) -0.057 0.079 0.142 0.097 -0.065 0.066 0.092 0.092
Respondent unemployed -0.002 0.221 -0.233 0.216 0.323 # 0.187 -0.027 0.202
Age 0.006 0.003 0.000 0.004 0.002 0.003 -0.002 0.004
Gender -0.281 *** 0.097 0.095 0.125 -0.024 0.082 0.035 0.118
Level of education 0.134 *** 0.047 0.099 0.070 0.017 0.040 0.017 0.065
Household income 0.014 0.012 0.018 0.017 0.005 0.010 0.001 0.016
Religiosity scale 0.011 0.017 -0.026 0.025 0.020 0.015 0.010 0.023
R-squared
Adjusted R-squared
       Significance levels *** = p<.001      ** = p<.01       * = p<.05      # = p<.1
0.562
0.425
OLS Regression Analysis of Trust in Constitutional Courts (a)
0.490
0.406 0.459
 
West Germany East Germany
(a)     Regression analysis based on 2000 ALLBUS survey. Table entries are unstandardized OLS regression coefficients and their associated standard errors.
Trust in Bundesverfassungsgericht
Models
Trust in European Court of Justice
West Germany East Germany
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TABLE 1: 
 
  
TABLE 2: 
FACTORS EXPLAINING TRUST IN THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL COURT RELATIVE TO 
TRUST IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AND PARLIAMENT IN WEST GERMANY 
 
Perceived characteristics of the Federal 
Government and Parliament 
Perceived characteristics of the Federal 
Constitutional Court 
Active 
Leadership expected 
Passive/reactive  
Leadership expected in crisis 
Staffed with people just like you and me (who 
are fallible) 
Staffed with highly competent professionals 
(who are infallible) 
Political/partisan 
Subject to external pressure 
Non-political/non-partisan 
Independent 
Constrained only by ideology 
Self-interested 
Constrained by constitution 
Interested in common good 
 
TABLE 3: 
FACTORS EXPLAINING TRUST IN THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE 
RELATIVE TO TRUST IN THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL COURT IN WEST GERMANY 
Degree of 
Experience 
and 
Information 
Perceived 
difference between 
self/Germans and 
Europeans 
Mitigating Factors  Functional Link 
Trust in 
European Court 
of Justice  
Relative to Trust 
in Federal 
Constitutional 
Court 
Low Strong  None  No  Lower 
Low  Medium to Strong  Support for European 
integration 
Yes, but cognitive 
shortcut  Equal 
Low Irrelevant  Competence/Skills of 
Justices  Yes Higher 
 
  
TABLE 4: 
FACTORS EXPLAINING TRUST IN THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL COURT RELATIVE TO 
TRUST IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AND PARLIAMENT IN EAST GERMANY 
Perceived characteristics of the Federal 
Government and Parliament 
Perceived characteristics of the Federal 
Constitutional Court 
Political/partisan 
Subject to external pressure 
Non-political/non-partisan 
Independent 
Constrained only by ideology 
Self-interested 
Constrained by constitution 
Interested in common good 
Active 
Leadership expected 
Passive/reactive  
Leadership expected in crisis  
TABLE 5: 
FACTORS EXPLAINING TRUST IN THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE 
RELATIVE TO TRUST IN THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL COURT IN EAST GERMANY 
Degree of 
Experience 
and 
Information 
Perceptions of the 
European Union 
and the ECJ/EU 
law 
Mitigating Factors  Functional Link 
Trust in European 
Court of Justice  
Relative to Trust in 
Federal 
Constitutional 
Court 
Medium 
Threatening to 
‘harmonize away’ 
national identity, no 
human rights 
protection 
None Yes  Lower 
Medium 
ECJ as dependent 
(on the Advocate 
General), not part of 
a democratic 
structure 
Hope for 
disentanglement/ 
strengthening of 
democratic structures 
Yes 
Lower,  
but potential for  
equal trust 
Low 
A good thing, 
necessary for 
integration 
Support for the idea of 
political integration in 
order to play a more 
important international 
role 
Yes, but 
cognitive 
shortcut 
Equal 
 
 